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Highlights 
 SMEs paying a higher loan price compared with 2009. Micro firms suffering 
the most. 
 Female-headed firms experienced an increase in interest rates on bank loans. 
 Reduction in public guarantees and a firm’s capital/prospects influenced loan 
terms.  
 Banks’ funding cost pass-through to SMEs. Higher capitalization reduced 
covenants. 
 Banks’ credit cycle, GDP per capita and growth had a big impact on SMEs’ 
loan terms. 
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The Determinants of the Terms and Conditions of Bank Loans to 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the European Union 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the impact of firms’ operational and financial performance 
alongside banking/financial/economic conditions on SME bank loan terms and 
conditions during a period of economic uncertainty. We observe that since 2010, more 
firms have experienced an increase in loan price. Firms’ size, age, profit/cost and 
capital position are important determinants of the terms and conditions of bank loans. 
Female-headed enterprises pay relatively higher interest rates. Public guarantees play a 
positive role in loan terms setting. Better capitalized and higher funding cost banks 
charge higher interest rates. The time it takes to settle insolvencies affects the loan 
maturity period. GDP per capita and growth significantly influence the terms and 
conditions of SME bank loans. 
 
 
JEL classification: G20; G21; G23; G28; L11 
Keywords: Bank loans, Loan price; Collateral; Loan maturity; Small and medium-sized 
enterprises  
1. Introduction 
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Despite unprecedented financial stimulus by various governments and the European 
Central Bank (ECB), there have been invariable worries relating to the credit 
availability and strings attached for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Recent studies by Casey and O’Toole (2014) and Holton et al. (2014) appraised the 
damage caused by the financial crisis on smaller European firms. However, these 
studies were mainly concerned with small firms’ choice and availability of finance, and 
they ignored a comprehensive analysis of approved bank loan terms and conditions 
(T&Cs). This study aims to identify the firm-specific, banking/financial market and 
economic factors that affected the availability and T&Cs of bank loans to SMEs during 
this period of economic and financial uncertainty. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
Our data are drawn from survey data on the access to finance of SMEs in the Euro 
area collected biannually by the ECB between 2009 and 2013. We model the T&Cs of 
bank credit by using a two-step selection equation method where the decision to apply 
for credit and the T&Cs of credit are determined sequentially. Demand for credit is 
determined by the dummy variable (being equal to one) when a firm applies for a bank 
loan (and zero otherwise). Based on the risk appetite of banks, prevailing economic 
conditions and firm demographic features and operational performance, the T&Cs of 
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bank loans could get tighter, softer or remain unchanged over time. We consider two 
‘price’ (interest rates and arrangement fees/commission), and four ‘non-price’ (size, 
maturity/duration, collateral and covenants) T&Cs. The change in these T&Cs would, 
in fact, be partly dependent on the risk profile of the applicant firm. A firm could 
become more risky, less risky, or maintain its risk rating over time. This ordering of 
risk would determine the subsequent ordering of T&Cs (tighter, softer or no change).  
 
For each of the six T&Cs, firms were specifically asked the question, “could you please 
indicate whether they increased, remained unchanged or decreased the past six 
months” in each survey questionnaire. Firms were asked to circle one of three codes 
(1 for “increased by the bank”, 2 for “remained unchanged” and 3 for “decreased by 
the bank”). To model the ordering of these outcomes, we use an ordered probit with 
a sample selection method to observe the impact of firm-specific, banking/financial 
market, legal structure and economic conditions variables on the T&Cs of bank loans 
subject to firms applying for these loans. For ease of interpretation, in our estimation, 
we recode “increased by the bank” as 3, “remained unchanged” as 2 and “decreased 
by the bank” as 1. Country fixed effects and survey calendar effects dummies are also 
included to accommodate country- and time-specific heterogeneity. Country-specific 
median bank data are extracted from Bankscope and the economic/legal/credit 
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conditions variables are extracted from the World Development Indicators and 
Eurostat. 
 
3. Results 
The average marginal effect estimates, (Table 1) show that firms operating in Spain, 
Cyprus and Luxembourg encountered an increase in loan price (interest rates and fees). 
Irish firms experienced an increase in fees alongside a reduction in size and maturity. 
Firms from Luxembourg and the Netherlands also reported a decrease in loan size. 
Not surprisingly, Spanish firms, in addition to an increase in interest rates and fee, also 
faced an increase in loan covenants, while Italian firms paid a higher fee alongside a 
reduction in loan size. German firms experienced a reduction in price, collateral and 
covenants alongside an increase in size and maturity. Firms operating in France, Greece 
and Portugal did not experience a significant increase in interest rates. Greek firms 
however, experienced a significant reduction in loan size and firms from Portugal 
enjoyed a significant reduction in loan collateral. The survey year dummy variable 
estimates show that the increase in loan price was more prevalent during 2010–12 
compared with no significant changes in the non-price feature of loan contracts, 
indicating that credit rationing may have been introduced through the rejection of loan 
applications and increase in price. 
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Financially autonomous firms did not experience an increase in loan collateral. Firms 
headed by women experienced an increase in interest rates compared with male-headed 
firms. One possible reason could be gender discrimination in loan terms negotiations. 
Similarly, relatively young age firms had to pay higher interest rates compared with very 
old firms. Very young firms did not experience an increase in fees. Middle aged firms 
experienced an increase in collateral. Contrary to micro size firms (<10 employees), 
middle-sized and large firms experienced significantly lower loan prices, were able to 
take out larger size loans, and were not demanded more collateral or strict covenants.  
 
Not surprisingly, firms affiliated with the construction industry reported an increase in 
loan collateral compared with other industries. Wholesale/retail firms suffered a 
decrease in loan size and increase in collateral. Interestingly, an increase in the 
debt/asset ratio resulted in an increase in loan size and maturity. The impact of 
increasing leverage on loan size and maturity thus indicates that low and average risk 
firms also suffered during this period as a result of adverse selection. The reduction in 
a firm’s credit history led to an increase in interest rates and decrease in loan size. The 
estimates further indicate that a decrease in a firm’s past or expected profit, capital 
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position and access to public support resulted in an increase in price, collateral and 
covenant requirements alongside a reduction in size of the loan. 
 
We have strong evidence to support the pass-through practice of banks, demonstrating 
that an increase in banks’ borrowing costs results in an increase in the interest rates 
charged on loans to SMEs. Better capitalized banks introduce fewer covenants but 
charged higher interest rates. Higher capitalization could have been used to meet the 
capital adequacy requirement imposed by the Basel Accords. Interestingly, higher 
credit risk (impaired loans/gross loans) did not increase loan interest rates; in fact, it 
led to a reduction. This finding could indeed point to the vicious cycle that exceptional 
growth in non-performing loans is inevitably accompanied with lower interest rates 
and high loan growth. The estimates show further that an increase in the growth of 
bank loans resulted in a reduction in interest rates, fees, collateral and covenants and 
an increase in loan size. A longer time to resolve insolvencies increased loan maturity 
and a more transparent credit information system increased loan fees. Higher GDP 
growth led to an increase in loan fees, reduction in size and maturity and an increase 
in loan collateral and maturity. Higher GDP per capita reduced price and increased the 
size and maturity of loans to SMEs. 
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Table 1: Average Marginal Effect Estimates of the T&C of SMEs’ Bank Loans (impact on predicted probability of ‘increased by 
the bank’) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables interest fee size maturity collateral covenants 
       Belgium  -0.08446 0.07839 -0.07591* 0.01998 -0.06056 -0.03422 
Cyprus 0.35000** 0.42818** -0.09791 0.07597 0.01015 0.09514 
Germany -0.10842*** -0.12003*** 0.03911*** 0.03403*** -0.09902*** -0.05541** 
Spain 0.12800*** 0.16321*** -0.00029 0.01475 0.06232 0.11367*** 
Finland 0.04609 0.08049 -0.06189 0.04684 -0.00953 0.00999 
France -0.16909*** 0.08831 -0.04227 -0.00908 -0.01667 -0.00046 
Greece -0.14191*** -0.06683 -0.09050*** -0.01835 -0.03902 0.09656 
Ireland -0.00990 0.16575*** -0.17149*** -0.05034** -0.00061 0.03028 
Italy 0.08004 0.21698*** -0.07972** -0.03678 -0.02825 0.00566 
Luxembourg 0.60385** 0.72544** -0.33438** -0.13783 -0.06168 0.07595 
Malta -0.00566 0.33124* -0.14266 0.03850 0.00229 0.01943 
Netherlands 0.04717 0.04110 -0.09300*** -0.02001 -0.07961 -0.02405 
Portugal -0.12761** 0.08810 -0.05003 0.01259 -0.14334** -0.03850 
2009-2 0.02075 0.03826*** -0.00606 0.00943* 0.04502*** 0.01549 
2010-1 0.04884 0.05945* 0.05559*** 0.00802 0.02977 -0.07300* 
2010-2 0.21338*** 0.08839** 0.05817*** 0.00832 0.01107 -0.09214** 
2011-1 0.27204*** 0.12047*** 0.03382* 0.00112 0.02384 -0.01944 
2011-2 0.20154*** 0.11997*** 0.02082 -0.00535 0.03271 -0.02290 
2012-1 0.09369*** 0.11553*** -0.01034 -0.01021 0.05340** -0.00881 
2012-2 0.06379*** 0.08037*** 0.02046 0.00661 0.03353 -0.03916 
2013-1 0.04185* 0.04253* 0.00398 0.00157 0.00686 -0.04058 
Firm financially autonomous (d) -0.00742 -0.00800 0.00896 0.00353 -0.03850*** -0.02090* 
Firm headed by woman (d) 0.02387** 0.02034* -0.00648 -0.00783* 0.01411 0.00372 
Firm age very young (<2 years) (d) -0.00043 -0.06105*** 0.00263 0.01673* -0.00888 -0.05950** 
Firm age relatively young (2–5 years) (d) 0.02619** 0.01304 0.00075 -0.00398 0.01234 0.01065 
Continued  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables interest fee size maturity collateral covenants 
Firm age middle aged (5–10 years ) (d) 0.00872 -0.02109** -0.00018 -0.00118 0.02113** 0.01710 
Firm size small (number of employees 10–49) (d) -0.01457* -0.02700*** 0.01537*** 0.00582* -0.01632* -0.01925** 
Firm size medium (number of employees 50–249) (d) -0.03583*** -0.05168*** 0.02937*** 0.01758*** -0.04436*** -0.03177*** 
Firm size large (number of employees 250+) (d) -0.02959** -0.05898*** 0.05041*** 0.01235** -0.06652*** -0.04896*** 
Firm affiliation construction industry (d) -0.00097 0.01216 -0.01302* -0.00813* 0.03380*** 0.02206* 
Firm affiliation manufacturing industry (d) -0.01590* 0.00737 0.00270 0.00173 0.01270 0.00426 
Firm affiliation wholesale/retail industry (d) 0.00617 0.01526* -0.01180** -0.00466 0.03794*** 0.02314** 
Firm debt/asset ratio increased (d) 0.00090 0.00810 0.04922*** 0.02256*** 0.01385* 0.00485 
Firm credit history unchanged/worsened (d) 0.02371*** 0.00922 -0.02010*** -0.00413 0.01421* -0.00332 
Firm profit over the past 6 months decreased (d) 0.02131*** 0.02638*** -0.01712*** -0.00621** 0.02602*** 0.01970** 
Firm-specific outlook (profit/sale) worsened (d) 0.03222*** 0.04502*** -0.02279*** -0.00712** 0.06660*** 0.06503*** 
Firm access to public guarantees worsened (d) 0.05767*** 0.08458*** -0.03628*** -0.00875*** 0.11281*** 0.12007*** 
Firm own capital position worsened (d) 0.04669*** 0.04100*** -0.04216*** -0.00932*** 0.08125*** 0.06883*** 
Banking industry capitalization (%) 0.01011** 0.00040 0.00111 0.00067 -0.00758 -0.01208** 
Banking industry net charge-off/net income (%) -0.00123*** -0.00053** 0.00037*** 0.00004 -0.00013 -0.00056** 
Banking industry impaired loans/gross loans (%) -0.00605*** -0.00200 0.00017 -0.00021 0.00326* 0.00160 
Banking industry interbank ratio (%) -0.00230*** -0.00096*** -0.00008 0.00009 -0.00016 0.00008 
Banking industry competition (herfindahl index) 0.26711 0.23660 0.18058* 0.04621 0.11681 0.11814 
Banking industry loans growth (%) -0.00729*** -0.00526** 0.00521*** 0.00064 -0.00589** -0.00968*** 
Banking industry return on equity (%) -0.00128 -0.00131 -0.00087* -0.00035 0.00108 0.00290*** 
Banking industry price of borrowed funds (%) 0.03902*** 0.01224 0.00410 -0.00535 0.00389 -0.00071 
Country govt. debt/GDP ratio (%) 0.00139*** 0.00011 0.00042* 0.00028 -0.00005 0.00007 
Country time to resolve insolvencies (years) 0.00005 0.01683 -0.02251 0.02734*** 0.00355 -0.02028 
Country credit information asymmetry index (score 1–6) 0.05340* 0.07656** -0.03273* -0.00256 0.01151 0.02265 
Country GDP growth rate (%) 0.00279 0.00625** -0.01061*** -0.00700*** 0.00931*** 0.01334*** 
Country private debt/GDP ratio (%) -0.00034 -0.00029 0.00021 0.00004 0.00015 0.00010 
Country GDP per capita (000 US$) -0.00349* -0.00337* 0.00308*** 0.00196** 0.00079 -0.00091 
       Observations 20542 20309 20381 19846 20267 19328 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; d stands for dummy variable.
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